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ABSTRACT
Both the inventory theory and the asymmetric
information theory assume that dealers possess
no information advantage compared to other
market participants. However, dealers can observe
market liquidity from more aspects than any other
participants do, and therefore have better
information on market liquidity. Does this liquidity
information advantage lead to profit? Using a
detailed 3-month transaction data from London
Stock Exchange, I examined dealer’s information
advantage by analyzing dealers’ trading revenue
and the components. The results strongly support
that liquidity information does matter to dealers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The study of market liquidity has gained academic
attention due to recent crises, which depress asset
returns and affect the efficient operation of the
financial market. With the availability of
transaction data, studies on liquidity have
extended from the equity market to the foreign
exchange market, the government market and
most recently, the corporate bond market1. 
Liquidity researches usually focus on two areas:
First, the relation between asset return and its
liquidity; and second, identifying and comparing
different liquidity proxies. Most research from the
first area has found that liquidity is priced in the
asset price, and that a liquidity premium does
exist in the equity market, foreign exchange
market, and fixed income securities market.
Researches in the second area are expanding
quickly. 
Liquidity refers to the easiness to trade an asset at
a fair price and in a timely manner. It arises from
the demand and supply of the asset in the
market. In a dealership market, the market
makers2 are the liquidity providers. They directly
observe the security’s liquidity status. But in
market microstructure theories, where the dealer’s
pricing rule and trading behavior are modeled,
they are not modeled as having advantages on
liquidity information3.
If liquidity does affect asset return, then
information on liquidity is valuable. If dealers
have an advantage in accessing liquidity
information, can they consistently make profits
from this advantage?  It is the aim of this paper
to bridge this gap between the literature on
liquidity and the literature on market
microstructure. We analyze the significance of
liquidity information by examining dealers’
trading revenue in the London’s fixed- income
securities market. 
Different liquidity proxies have been used to
measure different aspects of bond liquidity, such
as trading activity, number of dealers and the
bond-specific characteristics. Some of these
proxies, such as bond specific characteristics, can
be directly observed by the public. But the public
cannot directly observe proxies that are related to
trading activities. This is because the fixed income
market is mainly an over-the-counter market.
Trading information is not directly and
immediately disseminated across the market.
Dealers, however, as liquidity providers, observe
most of the trading activities and therefore have a
better understanding of market liquidity than any
other market participant does.  Private
fundamental information in the risky fixed-income
securities market is less prominent than that in
the equity market, because bonds’ future cash
flows are well scheduled, and have less risk than
equity shares from the same issuer. Therefore,
liquidity information may play a more significant
role in the market. 
We first examine whether market making in this
market is profitable. Then we examine whether
dealers with a higher level of liquidity information
outperform dealers with a lower level of
information. Next we estimate the bid-ask spread
of securities from transaction data, and finally
decompose the dealer’s total trading revenue into
spread revenue and position revenue. The position
revenue summarizes the dealer’s ability to earn a
profit from his information. 
We find that in general, dealers earn positive
trading revenue, but not position revenue. We find
for dealers as a whole, liquidity information
positively contribute to position revenue but not
statistically significant. While considering dealers
possessing different level of information, we find
that those dealers who have higher level of
liquidity information earn much more than other
dealers do. Our results thus support the
hypothesis that, not only liquidity status affects
asset value, but that liquidity information itself
also generates profit. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents a literature review on a dealer’s
trading revenue from theoretical and empirical
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1 See for example, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Datar et al (1998) in equity markets; Ito et al (1998) in the foreign
exchange market. Amihud and Mendelson (1991) in the government bond markets; and Chen et al (2004), Houweling et al
(2003) in the corporate bond market. 
2 We use market maker and dealer interchangeably. 
3 Inventory theory model assumes that there is no information relates to asset payoffs prevailing in the market. The dealer’s
trading rule is governed by his perception of incoming order flow in order to keep his inventory in equilibrium. Asymmetric
information theory realizes that informed traders have private fundamental information on the asset value, and dealer trade to
balance their loss to informed traders. In this type of theory the information prevailing is the fundamental information that
relates to the payoff of the asset, and it is the informed public trader, but not the dealer that has the information. Although later
theories suggest dealer may act strategically to gain information from informed order flow, none of the theories suggests that
dealers have information advantage and could be benefit from their information advantage. 
aspects. Section 3 describes the data we use.
Section 4 presents the methodology used, and the
estimation procedure. Section 5 discusses the
empirical results. In Section 6 we summarize the
study. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Implications of market microstructure
theory
The traditional market microstructure theories
model market maker trading behavior from two
main considerations: the inventory control
consideration and the asymmetric information
consideration. 
In inventory models such as Garman (1976),
Amihud and Mendelson (1980), and Ho and Stoll
(1983), the underlying assumption is that no
traders (including market makers and public
traders) have superior information on a security’s
fundamental value. Even in a multiple dealership
market, dealers have the same level of knowledge
on the fundamental value of a security. In such a
setting, the dealer’s main problem is to set the
price to balance the incoming flow of orders and
keep his inventory in a certain preferred range.
This happens because the direction of the next
period’s incoming order flow is never certain and
an order flow imbalance is inevitable. The
preferred inventory works purely as a buffer to
balance the incoming orders. As a result, dealers
do not expect to earn profit from their inventory.
Furthermore, because dealers do not trade on
their knowledge of fundamental information, the
effect of their trading behavior on the price of a
security is only temporary as the price converges
to true value in the long run, when order flows
are balanced. So whether the inventory position
will eventually earn them profit is ambiguous. In
the inventory model, dealers will earn bid-ask
spread, but when they execute trades that will
lead the inventory to deviate from the desired
level, this spread revenue will be eroded by the
deterioration of inventory. 
If the prediction of a dealer’s profit from the
inventory model is only inferential, asymmetric
information theories make strong predictions
about a dealer’s trading profit. 
In asymmetric information models of market
making such as Copeland and Galai (1983),
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), and
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), the common
fundamental assumption is that asymmetric
information prevails in the market. The dealer
faces two types of traders: the informed trader
and the uninformed trader. The informed trader
has a certain level of private information of the
security value, so he/she can buy low and sell
high. The uninformed trader trades because of
liquidity reasons that are unrelated to the
security’s fundamental value. A dealer doesn’t
have an information advantage over the informed
trader but he does know that if he trades with an
informed trader he will always lose. The dealer’s
problem in price-setting is to offset losses from
trading with informed traders by trading gains
from uninformed traders. 
Copeland and Galai (1983) modeled a risk-neutral
dealer’s one-period pricing rule. Dealer’s gain is a
weighted-average of expected loss from informed
trade and expected gain from uninformed trade.
The weight is the probability of informed trades
and the probability of uninformed trades. The bid-
ask spread arises as a dealer maximizes this gain.
If competition is introduced in this monopolistic
framework, a dealer’s gain in equilibrium will
reach zero, and as a result, spread revenue will
just compensate the losses to the informed trader.
This is the explicit assumption of Glosten-
Milgrom’s (1985) model. In this model, risk-
neutral dealers set prices under the condition of
zero expected trade profit. Because each market
maker has the same level of knowledge of a
security’s value and trade information, they will
have the same pricing rule.  This zero-profit
equilibrium condition is also found in other
models, which model the strategic trading
behavior of traders, as researched in Kyle (1985)
and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). 
To sum up, the asymmetric information model has
two implications on dealer profit: First, in a
competitive dealership market, spread revenue will
be perfectly offset by position loss, so dealers
should earn zero total profit in equilibrium.
Second, dealers are homogeneously non-informed
traders. They have the same level of fundamental
information and market information, so cross-
sectionally, they will earn zero total profit. 
In practice, at least three facts contradict the
previous theory: first, as we discussed in the
introduction, dealers do have market information
that is not available to informed traders. Second,
the information dealers have is not homogeneous.
Dealers may either have more skill, which enables
them to interpret trade information better than
others, or they may simply observe more trade
than others do, and consequently have a better
understanding of market liquidity. All the liquidity
information helps them make better predictions
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about asset prices which impact their trading
decisions. Third, dealers may have other ways to
infer the information contained in a security
rather than trade with informed traders. It is
common for dealers usually to hold more than
one security. If the securities are correlated,
information can be implied from trading in other
securities. This information, either fundamental or
non-fundamental, helps dealers make better
trading decisions. 
2.2. Empirical researches on dealers’ trading
revenue
In most previous empirical studies on market
microstructure, investigation into dealers’ trading
revenue is limited to spread revenue only.  Results
on position revenue are only inferential. It was
only recently, when detailed transaction data
became available, that a detailed estimation of a
dealer’s trading revenue became possible. But
even with detailed transaction data, an estimation
of position revenue is still subjective to some
extent, because position revenue depends on a
dealer’s inventory and the liquidity price of the
inventory, while the benchmark for the liquidity
price is difficult to decide.   
Manaster and Mann (1998) analyze the trading
revenue of futures traders on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange during the first six-months of
1992. Their data gives details of transactions,
including the trading capacity of each participant
and the trading direction, which enables them to
break down dealers’ trading profits into an
execution component and a timing component on
a trade-by-trade basis. The execution component
of trading profit is the effective spread the dealer
charged customers, while the timing component
of trading profit is the position revenue dealers
earned from price movement. As the futures
market is a very liquid market, Manaster and
Mann use the one-minute price benchmark and
five-minute price benchmark to calculate position
revenue. 
A few of their findings contradict theoretical
predictions. First, they find that when customers
trade with market makers, they do not necessarily
have executive disadvantage (negative execution
in their paper). In fact, they frequently have
positive execution. Second, on average, market
makers earn positive trading profit; and not only
do they enjoy positive execution profit, but they
also have positive timing profit. This finding is
more pervasive at higher volume quartiles. Third,
they find that when market maker’s timing profit
is high, customer execution costs are also high.
They also find that market makers seem to give
up some of their execution advantage in order to
make a favorable trade. This finding suggests
market makers may act strategically, and this
strategic trading behavior is the focus of the
research by Neuberger and Hansch (1996). 
Neuberger and Hansch (1996) investigate the
strategic trading behavior of equity dealers on the
London Stock Exchange. They argue that if dealers
can learn information from order flow, they may
trade strategically in order to make money on
their own account whilst not fully reveal the
information. They project that dealers can
differentiate informed trades and uninformed
trades, and if they do act strategically, it should
be reflected in the profitability of different types
of trade. The informed trades and uninformed
trades are defined based on trade size and trade
direction relative to dealers’ pre-trade inventory
position. So in this paper, the focus is on breaking
down trade types and estimating the revenue
from different trade types, rather than
decomposing the components of revenue itself. 
Using one-year detailed transaction data from
1991 to 1992 for 30 liquid stocks, they find that
the majority of the market makers actually made
trading losses over the year, and that overall,
trading revenue margin is zero. They find that
revenue from different types of trade is different,
that dealers earn less from informed trades than
they earn from uninformed trades. However, they
find that the higher proportion of uninformed
trades a dealer executed, the less a dealers’
overall trading revenue margin was. The finding
that dealers who execute more informed trades
make significantly more money on these trades
than dealers who execute less informed trades,
suggests that dealers learn from the informed
order flow.   
Other researches that examine dealers’ trading
behavior from different aspects have made similar
findings that dealers may trade strategically but
overall make very low profit margins – not
significantly different from zero. For example,
Hansch et al. (1999) examine the effects of
preferencing and internalization of order flows on
execution cost and dealers’ profit on the London
Stock Exchange. They find that on average, dealers
have net trading losses as their spread revenue is
exceeded by the position loss. When breaking down
the trade into size categories, they find dealers
make money on small trades, break even on large
trades, but lose money on medium-sized trades. 
One important aspect that those papers haven’t
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investigated is whether a dealer’s revenue is also
related to his portfolio consideration. Many
papers have argued the importance of considering
portfolio effect on dealers’ trading. In the original
inventory model of Ho and Stoll (1983), the
inventory position of the dealer is one
determinant factor of his pricing rule. Later
empirical works, such as that of Naik and Yadav
(2003a), particularly emphasize the importance of
a dealer’s portfolio consideration in his/her
trading behavior. 
Hansch and Saporta (1998) investigate the
trading revenue of UK government bond (gilts)
market makers, considering dealers’ positions in
both the cash market and the derivative market.
In this study, they have detailed transaction
records of gilts market makers, including their
derivative transaction records and actual daily
inventory positions. They find that in contrast to
equity dealers, gilts dealers earn positive gross
trading revenue, although this is not statistically
significant. This positive gross trading revenue is
not affected whether the dealer’s derivative
position is considered or not, although they do
find there are offsetting effects between a
dealer’s cash position and his derivative position.
Trade types do have effects on dealers’ trading
revenue. Dealers earn high trade margins in small
and large trades, with medium-sized trades
offering the lowest margins. After decomposing
dealers’ revenue into spread revenue and position
revenue, they find that, in sharp contrast to other
previous findings in the equity market, dealers still
earn positive position revenue. 
An analysis of dealers’ trading revenue has also
been conducted in the foreign exchange market.
Lyons (1998) examines the trading revenue of one
active DM/$ dealer for a week. He finds that this
dealer earns significant profit, and besides that,
the main profit source is spread revenue, and part
of the revenue comes from the dealer’s position.
Does this imply dealers have information
advantage in the foreign exchange market? Ito et
al (1998) argue that private information exists in
the foreign exchange market, and they define this
private information as semi-fundamental private
information, which, in contrast to fundamental
private information, is unrelated to the payoff of
the security but relevant to interim prices. Semi-
fundamental private information includes traders’
risk aversion, supply and distribution of the risk
assets, and any information about trading
environments. 
At first glance, the trading revenue of dealers
varies according to the specific market examined.
But it may well support our conjecture that
liquidity information itself will bring profit. In the
equity market, when fundamental private
information plays an important role in driving
stock prices, dealers generally make a loss on their
position revenue. In markets where fundamental
private information plays a minor role, dealers can
benefit from liquidity information at their
disposal, which may be the reason behind the
positive position revenue find in the foreign
exchange market (Lyons, 1998) and the
government bond market (Hansch and Saporta,
1998). In the corporate bond market, where
trades have less fundamental private information
content than the equity market, but higher
information content than the government bond
market or foreign exchange market, to what
extent can dealers benefit from their information
advantage? This is a question that has not been
well examined. 
3. DATA
In this study we use two sources of data. The first
data set is the London Stock Exchange TDS
transaction data, which gives details of trade
information. The second data is Quiscore from Qui
Credit Assessment Ltd. This data gives the credit-
quality information of UK domestic issuers, which
we use to infer the credit quality of the issues. 
3.1 The transaction data and the cleaning
procedure
The transaction data contains the trade reports of
the trade participants. It contains the trade
volume, trade price, trade time, the identities of
both trading parties and their capacities, and also
indicates the trade direction for the reporting
party (a buy or sell). The trade price is reported as
the clean price, without the coupon accrual that is
actually paid by the buyer or discounted by the
seller, depending on which trade party is entitled
to the next coupon payment. 
The data is very reliable. However, there are a few
problems with the data that need to be sorted
out. First, some trade records are contra-
transaction records. It indicates that another trade
record that has the same trade details contains
mistakes. In these cases, we delete the contra-
transaction records and the trade records
associated with them. 
Second, in most trades, both sides of the trading
parties reported the transaction details, so we
have two records for the trade. But some
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transactions are only reported once by one of the
trading parties. To find out whether the trading
records are the same transaction we need to look
at its transaction number. Every day the Exchange
assigns a unique transaction number for each
trade. So if a trade was reported twice by both
trade parties, the two records will bear the same
transaction number. 
Third, there are shaped trades where a dealer or
broker splits a big order into a few smaller trades.
When dealers split the trade (i.e. Shape), the
transaction can be recorded several times depends
on the number of times it is split. For example,
dealer A split a £10,000 sell order into two,
£3,000 with dealer B and £7,000 with dealer C
(dealer A, B, C may execute the trade in the
capacity of either principal or agent). In this
example, we will have three records of different
transaction volume, price and quantity. The
reported actual trading time may also differ. It
often happens that one party may omit the
volume or trading value while reporting the
trades, so we have zero volume or zero value trade
records. Again, we rely on transaction numbers to
match all these records. Sometimes we find that
the trading value of the buy side of the shaped
trade does not equal the trading value of the sell
side of the trade, perhaps as a result of a
rounding error, as the differences never exceed 10
pence. In these cases we take the average trading
value as the real trading value for this trade. 
When dealers trade through inter-dealer brokers,
the transaction will be reported four times, since
inter-dealer brokers report the transaction as two
separate transactions. We take this into
consideration when calculate transaction numbers
and volume. 
Fourth, it appears that some prices are wrongly
recorded, as we sometimes find that the prices
reported at the time are more than 10 times
larger (or smaller) than the trade price
immediately before or after it. We apply a filter
rule as follows: first, we calculate the par value
price for each trade. We index the transaction
from 1 to T, and let denote the individual trade
price. We calculate the price ratio as PR = Pi/Pn, n
= 1,...T, and n ≠ i. We define PR ≥ 10 and PR ≤
0.1 as the out-of-range price ratio, and the band
within the in-range price ratio. For each trade
record, if the number of the out-of-range price
ratio is bigger than the number of the in-range
price ratio, this trade record is excluded from the
sample. 
As many previous studies (such as Neuberger and
Hansch, 1996) have done, we have to ignore the
trade gains or losses on the initial inventory due
to lack of information on the initial inventory. This
could affect the results because a dealer may
have long or short initial inventory and then close
out during the sample period, while the trading
revenue we calculated will be based on the trades
executed during the sample period and the end
period price. There is no perfect solution to this
problem, so when we calculate the trading
revenue, we only consider the cases where a
dealer has made at least two buy and two sell
trades on a security. 
3.2 Credit rating
Credit rating on individual fixed income security is
rare in the UK during our sample period. Instead,
we have to rely on credit risk information on
issuers to infer the credit quality of issues. We use
Quiscore4 from Qui Credit Assessment Ltd to
identify the credit status of firms. As further
information on the bond’s seniority is not
available, we assign the same credit score to every
security that this firm issues. We acknowledge
that this is just a rough proxy for a security’s
credit quality. 
The Quiscore is a measure of the likelihood of
company failure in the 12 months following the
date of calculation. It is given as a number in the
range 0 to 100. There are five bands of Quiscore: 
81-100 is the secure band. Companies in this
band tend to be large and successful public
companies. Failure is very unusual and
normally occurs only as a result of exceptional
changes within the company or its market. 
61-80 is the stable band. In this band, company
failure is a rare occurrence and will only come
about if there are major company or
marketplace changes. 
41-60 is the normal band. This sector contains
many companies that do not fail, but some
that do. 
21-40 is the unstable band. In this band, there is
a significant risk of company failure: they are
on average four times more likely to fail than
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4 The QuiScore is based on statistical analysis of a random selection of companies. To ensure that the model is not distorted, three
categories are screened out from the initial selection: major public companies, companies that have sort insignificant amounts of
unsecured trade credit and liquidated companies that have a surplus of assets over liabilities. 
those in the normal band are.
0-20 is the high-risk band. Companies in this
sector are unlikely to be able to continue
trading unless significant remedial action is
undertaken, there is support from a parent
company, or special circumstances apply. But a
low score does not mean failure is inevitable. 
Based on these explanations, we categorize the
companies into investment grade and non-
investment grade companies. Investment grade
companies include band 1 and band 2 companies
(Quiscore 61-100), and non-investment grade
companies include band 3, band 4, and band 5
companies (Quiscore 0-60). Then we assign the
securities with the same credit status as the
issuers.
4. METHODOLOGY AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
4.1 Bid-ask Spread Estimation
The fixed-income market is an opaque market.
Because the regulations which apply to the equity
market do not apply to the fixed income market,
market makers of fixed income securities are not
obliged to display bid-ask quotes in fixed-income
securities on SEAQ, so no quotes are available in
the market. The bid-ask spread has to be estimated. 
We estimate the realized bid-ask spread by
matching the daily buy-side and sell-side
transaction prices of a security. This method is
similar to the method used by Chakravarty and
Sarkar (1999) and Hong and Warga (2000). These
two studies exclude bonds that do not have both
bid and ask prices for the same day. As a result,
their samples are likely to contain only the most
liquid bonds. Such a filtering procedure may not
be appropriate if the market is generally at the
low end of the liquidity spectrum.  
We calculate the bid-ask spread as follows:
(1)
where Bidt – Askt is the realized bid-ask spread for
a given bond on day t, PiA(PjB), is the price of
transaction i (j) occurring at the ask (bid), and
N(M) is the number of ask (bid) transactions for a
particular bond on day t.  If the bid (or ask)
transaction price is not available on a particular
day, we use the bid (or ask) transaction price of
the previous day. If both bid and ask transaction
prices are not available, no bid-ask spread is
calculated for that day.
Because the bid and ask transactions may not
happen on the same day and they may not come
from the same dealer consistently, there are
occasions where the bid-ask spread is negative.
We apply a filter rule to filter those transactions
that make the bid-ask spread negative. 
4.2 The credit-risk component and liquidity-
risk component of price premium
Bond’s credit risk and liquidity risk directly affect
its bid-ask spread and therefore dealer’s trading
revenue. Before we begin to analyse trading
revenue, we first need to quantify the credit risk
and liquidity risk. Without credit risk and liquidity
risk, the price of a fixed-income security should be
determined by its cash flow schedule and the
prevailing interest rate. If we define the
hypothetical price as the price determined by a
security’s cash flow schedule and current interest
rate, then any price premium between a risky bond
and its hypothetical price should be explained by
its credit risk and liquidity risk. We can then
decompose the price premium into a credit risk
component and liquidity risk component. 
This estimation is done in the following steps: 
Firstly, the daily price of the hypothetical risk-free
bond is constructed using Bank of England spot
rates.  
The Bank of England provides daily spot rates
with a maturity range from six months to 22.5
years. For bonds having maturities longer than
22.5 years, there are two choices for a long-term
spot rate: the first is to assume a flat spot rate
after 22 years, and second, to use the war loan
stock yield to proxy the rate. We choose the
second one, as the war loan stock yield is the only
indicator investors can have as the long-term
interest rate at that point of time, although it is
not much different from the 22.5 year spot rate.   
For each security, the daily hypothetical prices are
calculated as dirty prices, minus the coupon
accruals. For each bond at day t, we calculate the
hypothetical dirty price as follows:  
(2)
where
i: bond i. 
t: current trading date. 
c: annual coupon rate. 
f: the period of compounding.
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sp1 : the interpolated spot rate at the payment
date 
sp2 = st-1 + (st – st-1) * (NPt+1 – NDt)/365/2
where st is the half-year spot rate known at
trading date t, NPt+1 is the next payment date, and
NDt is the next half-year date to day t. 
Where yt is the Bank of England spot rate at day t,
and c is the semi-annual coupon payment, and N
is the total number of semi-annual cash flows.
Then the hypothetical clean price is calculated as
the dirty price, minus coupon accrual. The coupon
accrual is calculated as c*day/180, where c is the
half-yearly coupon payment, and day is the
number of days between the last coupon payment
date and the transaction time t.  
The price premium is estimated by taking the
difference between the hypothetical price and the
actual transaction prices on the day when there
are trades. If the actual transaction price is a
principal bid price, the price premium is
calculated as bid price+spread/2-hypothetical
price; if the actual transaction price is a principal
ask price, the price premium is calculated as the
ask price-spread/2- hypothetical price. 
Secondly, we estimate the liquidity proxies of each
security. 
Liquidity can be measured in different dimensions.
In this paper we consider the following liquidity
proxies: 
A. The price impact measure. 
The lower the market liquidity, the higher the
price impact of a certain sized trade. For a
thinly traded market, this measure may be a
better liquidity proxy than the estimated bid-ask
spread, which may contain noise introduced by
the estimation procedure.  
We estimate the price impact measure using
the following regression: 
(3)
where: 
ri,d:  the return of bond i on day d. 
rf,d: the return of a hypothetical bond with the
same structure as bond i on day d.
vi,d: the pound sterling volume for bond i on
day d.  
The estimated β is our measurement for price
impact. Bond returns in a given day are defined
as the difference between the bond price on
transaction day t-1 and transaction day t, plus
coupon accrual divided by the price on
transaction day t-1, where the bond price is the
mid price (bid price+spread/2 or ask price-
spread/2).  If there are more than one bid or
ask trades in a day, we take the average trade
volume and volume-weighted average price. The
formula for bond return is as follows:
(4)
where Pt is the mid-price of day adjusted for
coupon accruals. day is the number of days
between the last coupon payment day to the
transaction day t. c is the half-yearly coupon
payment of this bond.
When liquidity is low, price impact is large per
unit of volume. So the price impact measure
should be negatively related to liquidity status. 
B. Turnover, which is the total pound value of
transactions during the sample period, is
presented in million pounds. The higher the
turnover, the higher the market liquidity.
C. Number of trading days, which is the total
number of days when a security has been
traded. This is an indicator of trading frequency.
It is positively related to liquidity.
D. Number of market makers, which is the total
number of dealers who have traded the security
as principal. A security should be more liquid if
it has a lot of dealers making market on it.  
Finally, we assume that credit risk and liquidity
status stay the same over three months, and,
using the Quiscore as security’s credit risk proxy,
we decompose the price premium into liquidity
risk component and credit risk component using
the following regression:  
(5)
Where Premiumi is the average daily price premium
for bond i.  Credit is the Quiscore for bond i and
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liq is the following liquidity measure for bond i:
the price impact measure, total turnover, and total
number of dealers. All explanation variables have
been standardized. We assume that cross-sectional
bond risk premium is linear to credit risk and
liquidity risk, and the components of this premium
are constant all through the three- month sample
period. We use the White’s method to correct for
heteroscedasticity. 
4.3 The interest rate risk estimation 
The interest risk exposure is measured by the
duration. The most widely used duration measure
is the modified Macaulay duration (henceforth,
simply referred to as duration). The duration D at
time t of bond i maturity at time T is calculated as
follows: 
(6)
Where Pi,t is the market price of bond i at time t;
Ci,t is the coupon received from bond i, s periods
after time t; and yi,t is the yield to maturity on
bond i at time t. 
A dealer’s portfolio duration S is defined as
follows:
(7)
where Vi,tk is the pound sterling value of the
position (duly signed) of dealer k in bond i at the
end of day t, and Di,t is the modified duration of
bond i as defined in the equation above. 
There are some practical issues to consider in
estimating the duration. First we only have clean
price for the transaction. Based on market
practice, the duration is calculated using dirty
price, that is, the clean price plus the coupon
accruals.  
(8)
where c is the half-yearly coupon payment, and
day is the number of days between the last
coupon payment date and the transaction time t.  
Second, bonds are traded daily, and it is possible
that the next cash flow is not exactly six months
later. So the duration calculation has to be revised
to include the fraction period discount (See
Tuckman (2002) for examples of bad days). The
modified duration is therefore calculated as
follows: 
(9)
Where 
N: the number of semiannual coupon payments.
c: the semiannual coupon payment. 
τ: the fraction of semiannual coupon that is unpaid5. 
yi,t: the yield to maturity of bond i at time t,
calculated using dirty price. 
ptdirty: the dirty price calculated as the clean price
plus the coupon accruals. 
4.4 The trading revenue estimation 
In this study we estimate dealers’ total trading
revenue for the period August 1, 1994 through
October 30, 1994. An accurate estimation of
trading revenue requires the knowledge of the
dealers’ initial inventory position. Due to a lack of
this critical information, we assign all the dealers
zero initial inventories as previous studies do.
Therefore, we only look at the revenue that
dealers generated over this specified period. In
line with all the previous studies, we also ignore
the dealers’ commission6. 
Dealers’ trading revenue contains spread charges
for executing trades, and profit from inventory
through price movements. Fixed-income security
also pays coupons that shall be included in
trading revenue. 
We follow the same procedure and notation of
calculation trading revenue as Hansch and
Saporta (1998). The notions are explained as
follows: J denotes the total number of dealers in
the market, and letter j indicates the individual
11
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5 In calculating the payment periods, we adjusted for holidays and Weekends. If a payment date falls on a public holiday, then the
next working day will be the payment day. Since all the securities we considered are UK domestic securities, holidays are based
on the England and Wales bank and public holidays, which include New Year’s Day, Good Friday, Easter Monday, two bank
holidays in May, one holiday in August, Christmas Day, Boxing Day, and two bank holidays in December.  
6 It should be pointed out that we consider the trading behavior of both market makers and dealers who trade as principals.
Market makers don’t charge commissions for making markets, but dealers do. Since trades with commission are only part of the
total sample, and it will be arbitrarily to assign commissions, we ignore the commissions in calculating total trading revenue.
Most other researches also ignored the commission. 
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dealer. K denotes the overall security sample in
the market, and k indicates the individual security.
Transactions are indexed by t, and T denotes the
end transaction. D denotes the last day in the
sample period. P denotes the prices, and VWAP is
the value-weighted average price. Q denotes the
signed quantity of transactions; for fixed income
securities, it is the nominal value. If it is a dealer
buy (customer sell), Q<0, and if it is a dealer sell
(customer buy), Q>0.  C denotes coupon payment,
with the daily coupon rate denoted by c. Dealer’s
inventory is denoted by the letter I. 
The accrued interest is the amount of interest that
would be paid if the interest were paid each day.
We calculate the coupon payments on the dealer’s
end-of-day inventory on a daily basis. The total
coupon a dealer j receives is 
(10)
The revenue measureTR includes three components,
i.e. the spread revenue, the position revenue from
end-of-period inventory, and the accrued interest
earned during the trading period. We define
dealer j’s total revenue as follows:
(11)
The first term shows the revenue generated from
trading, and the second term shows the estimated
value of accumulated inventory.  The third term is
the accrued interest during the trading period. 
Similarly, we define that for a security, the
accumulated trading revenue is as follows: 
(12)
In this measure, the revenue from trades between
dealers will be cancelled, so it shows the dealers’
gain as a whole against the customers in security
k.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive statistics
In this study we analyze the trading revenue of
fixed-income dealers on the London Stock
Exchange over the period August 1994 to
October 1994. 
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for the
transaction data. Fixed-income securities with
similar characteristics are high substitutes. As we
discussed previously, trading revenue may reflect
this pattern. We group bonds into different
categorizes based on their credit-risk status and
term to maturiy. Based on the credit status of
issuers, we group securities into investment grade
bonds, non-investment grade bonds according to
their Quiscore bands, and bonds whose credit
status we do not know. Only UK domestic firms
have Quiscores, so our investment and non-
investment bonds are limited to domestic bonds.
Other bonds with unknown credit status include
domestic bonds, foreign bonds and some
Eurobonds. 
For each category of bonds, we further stratify
them into: Shorts (less than seven years to
maturity), Mediums (between seven and 15 years
to maturity), Longs (more than 15 years to
maturity), and Undated (including irredeemable
bonds and preference shares). 
Pane A reports the overall market activities of
security trading. We have 1,452 fixed- income
securities traded in the market over the sample
period. Of all the securities, 352 are investment
grade bonds, 148 are non-investment bonds, and
952 are securities with unknown credit grades.
Over the sample period, the total market turnover
is £5.45 billion. Transactions on investment grade
and non-investment grade securities count for
26.23% of total market turnover. Trading in
investment grade bonds is concentrated in Longs
(68.38% of turnover), and trading in non-
investment grade bonds is concentrated in
Mediums (44.31% of turnover). Across the time to
maturity span, trading is heavier in the long end
than the short end: total turnover in Shorts is
£0.84bn (15.46%), turnover in Mediums is
£1.21bn (22.19%), in longs it is £1.5bn (27.41%),
and in Undated it is £1.91bn (34.94%).
Trading activities are different across security
categories. In investment-grade bonds, short-term
bonds were traded the most actively, while in non-
investment grade bonds, undated bonds are
traded most actively. The undated bonds also
receive most trades in bonds with unknown grade. 
Over this period, 91 dealers make markets (traded
as principals) on 1,452 securities. Although we
can only identify the credit status for 34.95% of
total securities, we find that most market-makers
have made markets on them, especially on the
investment grade bonds. Undated securities
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receive more market making than any other fixed-
term security.
Over our sample period, the average trade size in
the market was £0.17m nominal7. Mean trade size
generally exceed the median, suggesting a strong
left skewness of the size distribution. The different
concentration of trading activity and turnover
implies that trade size varies across bond
categories. Short investment-grade bonds are
traded very actively, but the mean trade size is
small (£16,170), and the mean far exceed the
median (only £1,150), indicating that most trades
in this sector are retail trades. This pattern can be
found in both medium and undated investment-
grade bonds, except that the long investment-
grade bonds record an average trade size of up to
£0.6m, with £0.1m being the median trade size.
This suggests that institutional trades are
concentrated in long bonds in the investment
grade. For non-investment-grade bonds, the
average size of trades is generally higher, but the
median trade size never exceeds £50,000. For
unknown grade bonds, long bonds record the
biggest trade size (roughly £0.9m), which is more
than five times the market’s mean trade size. The
median trade size (£0.3m) is almost 30 times the
overall market median (£13,650).  The largest
trade is as high as £101m!  
Panel B reports the dealers’ trading activities
according to transaction category. Not
surprisingly, most trades happen between dealers
and institutions (including brokered trade and
direct trading between principals and customers).
This type of transaction accounts for 90%
(28,640) of the total number of transactions.
Direct and brokered inter-dealer trades are few in
this period, perhaps reflecting the illiquidity of the
market and/or the reluctance of risk-sharing
among dealers. Seven percent (2,338) of trades
are executed by agency cross, in which the
public’s orders are matched exactly. 
Total turnover between principal and institutional
trade accounted for 87% of total turnover. The
average trade size is £0.165m, and most of are
wholesale trades. Brokered and direct inter-dealer
trades, although accounting for only 6.7% of
total turnover, has the largest trade size of £0.8
and £0.28m, respectively.  Agency crossed trades
account for 6.6% of total turnover, but the trade
sizes are the smallest. Most agency crossed trades
are retail-sized trades.     
The distribution of the number of trades and
trading size is stable across different bond
categories.   
5.2 The credit spread and liquidity spread
5.2.1 The price premium  
For each security whose credit status we know, we
estimate the price premium between the actual
transaction price and the hypothetical price. We
only consider bonds that have been traded at
least for three days, have at least three principal
bid trades, and three principal ask trades, where
the trades did not take place simultaneously. We
further exclude a few securities where the
descriptions are not complete8. Finally we have
only 101 securities.
Table 2 summarizes the price premium. We have
66 investment-grade bonds, with a total turnover
of £6.11 million. The average price premium is
10.86 pence. Because they are investment-grade
bonds, some of them have very good credit
quality. The minimal price premium is only 0.01
pence, but the maximal price premium is 51.88
pence. We also have 35 non-investment grade
bonds with a total turnover of £3.43 million
pounds. The average price premium is 15.26
pence, with a minimal price premium of 1.26
pence and a maximal price premium of 83.26
pence. On average, the price premium is higher
for non-investment grade bonds than the
investment-grade bonds. 
5.2.2 The components of price premium   
The price premium between the transaction price
and the hypothetical price has two main
components: the credit-risk premium and the
liquidity-risk premium. In this section we
deconstruct  the two components.  
Table 3 shows the results for the deconstruction .
We expect the price premium to be negatively
related to the credit quality and the liquidity level.
The Quiscore is consistently negatively related to
the price premium, indicating that credit risk is
negatively related to price premium. The price
impact measure is positively related to the price
premium, which is consistent with the expectation
that low liquidity status increases the price
premium. This relation is confirmed by using the
turnover and number of trading days as the
liquidity proxy, that we find a negative relation
between these two proxies and the price
premium. It does not change the result to regress
13
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7 Hansch and Saporta (1998) estimate that the average trade size in the gilts market is roughly £2.9m nominal and the maximum
trade size is £645m nominal, over the period October 10, 1995 to May 31, 1996. 
8 Some securities have zero maturity dates and zero coupon rates. 
the premium on all the explanation variables.
However, we do not find a statistically significant
relationship from these regressions. 
5.3 Bid-ask spread and its determinants
Table 4 summarizes the results of estimated bid-
ask spread. Panel A presents the results of
securities included in price premium estimation
only. Panel B presents the results of all spread
estimation samples. Securities included in Panel A
are traded more frequently than securities
included in panel B, but the results are similar.
The average bid-ask spread is around 100 basis
points. This estimation is greater than estimations
in the Gilt market where most gilts have bid-ask
spread less than 50 basis points (Hansch and
Saporta, 1998). We find that investment-grade
securities have a slightly higher bid-ask spread
than the non-investment grade securities. This
may be caused by the slightly higher average
trading volume in non-investment grade securities. 
Bid-ask spread can be affected by many factors.
The inventory theory suggests that dealers can set
the bid-ask spread to offset inventory risk. So the
risks of the security will affect the bid-ask spread.
For corporate bonds, the usually considered risks
are credit risk and interest-rate risk. However, as a
proxy for liquidity, bid-ask spread is also affected
by other liquidity measures that reflect different
aspects of liquidity. To see the determinants of the
bid-ask spread, we estimate the following two
regressions: 
(13)
(14)
where yba is the bid-ask spread of bond j, Dj the
duration for bond j, Creditj is the Quiscore that
represents the credit risk for bond j, and α is the
corresponding coefficient of Quiscore from
equation (1). Lj is the liquidity measure for bond j.
We use the following liquidity measurements:
price impact, turnover, and the number of trading
days. The liquidity measures are timed by the
absolute value of the corresponding coefficient β
obtained from equation (1). All the measures are
standardized except for the price impact measure.
To correct for heteroscedasticity, we use White’s
correction for the standard error of estimators. 
The first regression tells us how bid-ask spread is
affected by the risks related to future cash flow;
the second regression tells how liquidity risk adds
explanation to the bid-ask spread, and also
compares the effects of different liquidity proxies. 
Table 5 summarizes the regression results.   
The bid-ask spread should increase with the risk of
a security. Without the liquidity risk proxies, the
bid-ask spread is positively related to interest risk
but negatively related to the credit risk (the
higher the Quiscore, the better the credit quality
of a security). The results are not statistically
significant. They show that there should be other
factors that affect the bid-ask spread. 
After adding the liquidity proxy, we find that
when using turnover as the liquidity proxy, it
significantly explains the bid-ask spread. At the
same time the interest rate risk is also a
significant factor of the bid-ask spread. Although
the price impact measure and trading days have
the expected relation with the bid-ask spread,
they do not have a significant relation with the
bid-ask spread. Credit risk seems to play a minor
role in bid-ask spread determination. This might
be because the sample securities have such high
credit quality that the credit risk is not prominent. 
When using the duration, Quiscore and all the
liquidity proxies as the explanation variables, we
find that turnover still has the most significant
effect on the bid-ask spread. 
Overall, our results may suggest that interest rate
risk and liquidity risk play an important role in
determining the bid-ask spread of the fixed
income securities. Credit risk may be a factor that
is less important than liquidity risk, which is best
proxied by the turnover of a security.  
5.4 Trading revenue
5.4.1 Summary of dealers’ trading revenue on
individual securities
Table 6 gives the summary of trading revenue
margins for the whole market-making industry
and for different security categories. Securities are
grouped by their credit status and time to
maturity (TTM). 
We consider all securities that have been traded
by dealers as principals, and consider only the
transactions that are principal trading. This
restricted sample contains 574 securities, which
account for 40% of securities traded in the
market but account for 63.76% of total market
turnover over the sample period. We identify 152
investment-grade bonds that account for 22.4%
of total sample turnover, 76 non-investment grade
bonds that account for 13.6% of total sample
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turnover, and the remaining 346 bonds with
unknown credit status that account for 64% of
total sample turnover. Sixty one out of 91 dealers
made market on these securities. So this sample is
well representative of dealers’ market-making
behavior.
Trading revenue varies from a loss of £1.13 million
in short bonds with unknown credit status to a
gain of £1.36 million in the investment-grade
long bonds. The market-making industry as a
whole earns positive trading revenue of £1.05
million over the three-month sample period. 
For the whole industry, market making appears
profitable. The overall revenue margin is 3.02
basis points. Dealers make profits on investment-
grade bonds, but in general lose on non-
investment grade bonds. We do not find that time
to maturity has any significant effect on trading
revenue. 
We also identify the percentage of losers in
security categories. It shows that for each security
category, the percentage of losers seldom exceeds
50%.  
5.4.2. Rank correlation between trading revenue
and order flow on individual security
The above results show that revenue margins are
different across dealers and securities, and
turnover may be an important factor that
determines a dealer’s revenue.   
As an initial test, we perform a rank correlation
test on a dealer’s trading revenue and his trading
volume. The hypothesis is that dealers who
observe more order flow or trades gain
information from these order flows, which they
can use to generate profit. 
We did two sets of rank correlation tests. The first
test is the rank correlation between the dealer’s
total trading revenue and his turnover on a
security. The second test is between a dealer’s
trading revenue margin and his turnover margin
on a security. The turnover margin is measured by
the proportion of the dealer’s turnover on the
security’s total turnover executed by all principals.
Table 7 summarizes the results.  We arrange the
securities by the number of the dealers who act as
principals to control for the competition on the
security. Whatever the level of competition, we
expect to see that the dealers with higher
turnover gain more. R1 is the correlation
coefficient between each dealer’s ranked revenue
and ranked turnover on a security, and t1 is the
corresponding t statistics. R2 is the correlation
coefficient between each dealer’s ranked revenue
margin and ranked turnover margin on a security,
and t2 is the corresponding t statistics.  
We define a security with or less than three
market makers as a security with less competition,
and securities with more than three market
makers as a security with higher competition.
There are 430 securities that have less than three
dealers making markets, and 144 securities each
have more than three market makers. Except for
the R2 for the highly competitive securities, all
the correlation coefficients are significantly
positive. This shows that trading revenue does
increase with dealers’ turnover. When we look at
the correlation between a dealer’s revenue margin
and his turnover margin, it still gives the same
positive relationship. It shows that the dealer’s
revenue does increase with his competitive
advantage on order flow, perhaps in a nonlinear
way9. Taking the sample as a whole, both
correlation coefficients are significantly positive.     
The finding shows that generally, the more
turnover the dealer has, the higher revenue and
revenue margin he will get. But it’s also
interesting to notice that this rule does not apply
to every dealer.  We will address the issue of
heterogeneity of dealers in a later section. 
5.5 Decomposition of trading revenue
Trading revenue has two components, the spread
component and the position component.
According to microstructure theories, dealers may
earn positive spread revenue, but will make
negative position revenue. However, if a dealer
has an information advantage that is significant
enough for him to make money, he may be able
to earn positive position revenue. 
5.5.1 The components of trading revenue margin
Table 8 summarizes the components of trading
revenue based on security credit status and time
to maturity. We decompose a dealer’s trading
revenue into spread revenue and position revenue.
The position revenue margin of dealer j on
security i is calculated as the difference between
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9 We have performed the test using a finer definition of competition to stratify bond category. The correlation coefficients are
always positive, but not always significant across categories. The results may be affected by our sample size. But it also shows
that when the competition is strong, the relation between revenue and order flow advantage is more apparent. This is especially
the case for a few securities where there are more than 10 market makers. The R1 are all significantly positive and exceed 0.5.
the dealer’s revenue margin (based on his own
turnover on this security) and the security’s bid-
ask spread.    
We restrict the sample to securities where dealers
make positive revenue. We have 300 securities
with 47 dealers making markets in these
securities.  The bid-ask spreads of these securities
are generally large, which on average exceed 100
basis points. Although dealers make positive
revenue on these securities, it mostly comes from
the bid-ask spread revenue. Based on the
security’s time to maturity, we find that dealers
only make positive position revenues on securities
at the long end, but make losses on securities at
the short end.   Overall, dealers make an average
position loss of 11.25 basis points.  
The results show that, in general, the market-
making industry of the fixed income market has a
tight profit margin. This result is consistent with
the theory predictions that dealers set the bid-ask
spread to compensate for the possible loss to the
informed traders.  
5.5.2. The determinants of position revenue
Position revenue reflects a dealer’s ability to profit
using his information. The above section shows
that dealers make position revenue on some
securities but lose on others. It is interesting to
explore the issue a bit further to understand the
possible determinants of position revenue.
Especially, we examine how interest-rate risk,
credit risk, and liquidity risk affect position
revenue. We estimate the following regression: 
(15)
Where Post,j is the position revenue margin for
dealer j on security i; Di is the duration of security
i; Crediti is the credit proxy of security i-here we
use Quiscore as the credit proxy; Tovi,j is the
turnover margin of dealer j on security i. We use it
as the liquidity proxy based on the analysis in
previous sections; and Basi is the average bid-ask
spread on security i. We use the White’s correction
to adjust for heteroscedasticity.
Table 9 summarizes the results. Not surprisingly,
the bid-ask spread has the most significant
negative relation to position revenue. As expected,
liquidity does contribute to position revenue.
Position revenue increases with the dealer’s
turnover margin and decreases with the bid-ask
spread. Credit risk and interest risk of the security
have a positive relation with the dealer’s position
revenue margin.  However, with the exception that
the bid-ask spread has a significant effect on
position revenue; none of the other factors
significantly affect position revenue statistically.  
5.6 The heterogeneity of dealers
Until now we have treated all the dealers as a
group. In fact, dealers are different in their
dealing capacity and so may have different levels
of order flow advantage. This is especially true in
a dealership market, where normally a few dealers
do the majority of trades on a security.  Those
dealers observe more order flows and have
contact with more customers, so they may obtain
better liquidity information than other minor
dealers in this security. 
We examine the heterogeneity of dealers by
comparing the trading revenue margins of the top
dealers and the non-top dealers. Top dealer is
defined as the dealer who has the highest
principal trade turnover on a security, and non-top
dealers are the other dealers who trade on this
security. 
We then estimate the following regression:  
(16)
Where Mari,j is the revenue margin for dealer j on
security i, and the revenue margin is defined as
the dealer’s trading revenue on a security divided
by the total turnover of a security in the sample
period. D is a dummy variable which takes the
value 1 when the dealer is a top dealer and zero
otherwise. Cn is a credit status dummy for the
security. When n=0, C0=0 and no other C exist in
the equation so there is no credit status dummy
exist in the equation. The security sample has
three credit statuses: investment grade, non-
investment grade and no credit information. When
n=1,2, Cn is a dummy variable which takes the
value 1 when the security is an investment grade
and non-investment grade security, respectively.  
We restrict the sample to the securities that have
bid-ask spread estimation, and also have at least
two principal dealers. We are left with 110
securities. But over 47 dealers make markets on
these securities, so it should to a good extent
reflect dealers’ trading results. Table 10 presents
the results for the above regression. The first
regression does not include the credit status
dummy where the second regression includes two
16
WO R K I N G PA P E R S E R I E S
credit status dummies. β, the coefficient of top
dealer dummy represents the difference between
the top dealer and the non-top dealer in terms of
the relationship with the revenue margin. We find
that whether to take into consideration the credit
status of security or not, β is significantly positive.
It suggests that the top dealers in general earns
significantly large revenue margin. 
To make a direct comparison between dealers and
show the economic significance of the results, we
present the average figures of the revenue margin
in Table 11. It is clear that top dealers earn much
higher revenue than the non-top dealers. Top
dealers earn positive revenue in every bond
category, while non-top dealers make losses on
non-investment grade bonds. Overall, the top
dealers make an average revenue margin of 33.79
basis points, and non-top dealers only make
revenue margin of 1.65 basis points. In sum, the
results show that dealers are heterogeneous, and
order flow information advantage does make a
difference in profit earning. 
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine whether liquidity
information advantage leads to profit by
examining the trading revenue of dealers in
London’s fixed income market during the period
August 1994 to October 1994. In such a market,
with opaque transaction information and a little
private fundamental information, dealers have
more information advantage on market liquidity
than public investors. Does this non-fundamental
information transfer into profit?  We examine
whether market making in this market is
profitable and whether dealers with a higher level
of liquidity information outperform dealers with a
lower level of liquidity information.  
First, we estimate the transaction costs of
corporate bonds. Using different liquidity proxies,
we find that liquidity proxies do affect our bid-ask
spread measure, as expected. 
Second, we estimate dealers’ total trading
revenue. The whole market-making industry makes
positive total revenue, but a negative revenue
margin. It shows there is heterogeneity in
individual dealers’ profit-making ability. Our rank
correlation test shows that, after controlling for
competitions on a security, dealers’ revenue and
turnover are significantly positively correlated. So,
in general, dealers who observe more order flow
make more gain. Our regression result for
determinants of trading revenue also shows that
trading revenue is positively related to a dealer’s
turnover and the liquidity status of the security. 
Third, we deconstruct the trading revenue into
spread revenue and position revenue. In general,
dealers do not make position profit. The result is
consistent with theory prediction, that the dealer
charges the bid-ask spread to balance his loss to
the informed trader. However, we still find
position revenue is positively correlated with the
dealer’s turnover compared to other dealers. This
finding suggests dealers may be different in
profit-earning, based on the level of liquidity
information they have. 
Finally we examine how dealers with different
levels of liquidity information differ from each
other in profit-earning. After separating dealers
into a top-dealer group and a non-top dealer
group, we find that, on average, top dealers earn
much higher revenue margins than the non-top
dealers. This result lends further support to the
hypothesis that dealers who observe more
liquidity (proxied by order flow) earn significantly
more than the others. 
To sum up, in this paper we anatomize dealers’
revenue in the fixed-income market. We find
evidence consistent with theory predictions that
trading revenue for the market- making industry
as a whole is not significantly different from zero.
However, we also find evidence that dealers’
liquidity information advantage positively
contributes to trading revenue, and the relation
may be non-linear. Furthermore, our findings
support that since dealers are heterogeneous on
liquidity information, dealers with a higher level
of liquid information can earn a higher profit than
other dealers. Thus, liquidity information is
valuable. 
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Table 2 Summary of Price Premium estimation 
This table summarizes the price premium estimation. Price premium is defined as the 
price difference between a risky security and a theoretic security with same structure 
but without credit risk or liquidity risk.  
#Sec is the number of the risky security included. Turnover is the securities’ total 
trading value in million pounds. Premium is the average price premium estimated 
presented in pence. Also presented are the standard deviation, minimal value and 
maximal value of the price premium.
Credit status #Sec 
Turnover
(£m)
Premium
(pence) Std 
Min 
(pence) 
Max 
(pence) 
Investment grade 66 6.11 10.86 9.27 0.01 51.88 
Non-investment grade 35 3.43 15.26 15.44 1.26 83.26 
Table 3 
This table summarizes the results of this regression: 
HED  iii liqCreditPremium
Where iPremium is the average daily price premium for bond i o.  Credit is the 
Quiscore for bond i and liq is the liquidity proxy for bond i: the price impact measure 
PI, total turnover, and total number of trading days. All explanation variables have 
been standardized. Figures in the brackets are the t values.  
 Quiscore PI Turnover #day 
1 -2.80 1.19 
 (-1.56) (0.84) 
2 -2.57  -1.12 
(-1.44)  (-0.66) 
3 -2.60 -0.07 
 (-1.45)  (-0.03) 
4 -2.75 1.12 -1.06 0.12 
(-1.31) (0.53) (-0.51) (0.06) 
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Table 4 Summary of Bid-ask Spread estimation 
This table summarizes the bid-ask spread estimation. #Sec is the number of security 
included. Turnover is the securities’ total trading value in million pounds. Spread is 
the estimated average bid-ask spread presented in basis points. Also presented are the
standard deviation, minimal value and maximal value of the bid-ask spread. 
Panel A presents the results of securities included in price premium estimation. Panel 
B presents the results of all spread estimation sample. 
Credit status #Sec 
Turnover
(£m)
Spread 
(bp) Std 
Min 
(bp) 
Max 
(bp) 
Panel A
Investment grade 66 6.11 126.43 79.31 12.50 440.00 
Non-investment grade 35 3.43 100.57 95.26 6.25 483.33 
Panel B
Investment grade 85 7.17 132.98 92.92 12.50 460.00 
Non-investment grade 46 4.42 94.94 97.93 2.63 483.33 
Other 213 20.13 96.95 86.98 0.75 462.12 
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Table 5 The Determinants of Bid-ask Spread 
This table summarizes the results of bid-ask spread determinants. We estimate 
regressions that take the following general form: 
jjjj
j
ba LCreditDy HEEDEED  )*()*( 321
Where bay  is the bid-ask spread of bond j, jC is the credit risk proxy for bond j, jD
the duration for bond j, and jL  is the liquidity measurement for bond j. We use 
duration as the interest risk proxy, Quiscore as the credit risk proxy, and the 
following liquidity measurements: price impact, turnover, and the number of trading 
days.   
Duration Qscore PI Turnover #day 
1 0.13 0.06 
1.29 1.96 
2 0.13 0.07 -0.24 
1.30 2.18* -1.41 
3 0.20 0.06 -0.29 
2.01* 1.93 -3.61** 
4 0.16 0.05 -2.48 
1.48 1.54 -1.76 
5 0.22 0.02 -0.17 -0.28 -1.03 
1.89 1.32 -0.75 -2.69** -1.10 
Note: * Significant at 5% level 
         ** Significant at 1% level 
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Table 7 
Rank correlation test between dealer’s revenue and turnover 
Table 7 summarizes the rank correlation tests between dealer’s revenue and his 
turnover on individual securities. #dealer is the number of dealer for each security, 
#sec is the total number of securities in this category. R1 is the correlation coefficient 
between each dealer’s ranked revenue and ranked turnover on a security, and t1 is the 
corresponding t statistics. R2 is the correlation coefficient between each dealer’s 
ranked revenue margin and ranked turnover margin on a security, and t2 is the 
corresponding t statistics. The turnover margin is calculated as the proportion of 
dealer’s turnover on the security’s total turnover executed by all principals.  
#dealer #sec R1 t1 R2 t2 
<=3 430 0.22 6.33** 0.08 2.34* 
>3 144 0.18 5.39** 0.04 1.18 
Total 574 0.20 8.17** 0.07 2.72** 
Note: * significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
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03/32 – Stephanie Hussels, Damian Ward & Ralf Zurbruegg
How Do You Stimulate Demand For Insurance? 
03/31 – Donal Flynn & Zahid I Hussain
A Qualitative Approach to Investigating the Behavioural Definitions of
the Four-Paradigm Theory of Information Systems Development
03/30 – Alexander T Mohr & Simone Klein
Adjustment V. Satisfaction – An Analysis of American Expatriate
Spouses in Germany
03/29 – David Spicer & Eugene Sadler-Smith
Organisational Learning in Smaller Manufacturing Firms
03/28 – Alex Mohr & Markus Kittler
Foreign Partner Assignment Policy & Trust in IJVs
03/27 – Avinandan Mukherjee & Rahul Roy
Dynamics of Brand Value Management of Entertainment Products – 
the Case of a Television Game Show
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03/26 – Professor Andrew Taylor
Computer-Mediated Knowledge Sharing and Individual User Difference:
An Exploratory Study
03/25 – Dr Axèle Giroud
TNCs Intra- and Inter-firms' Networks: The Case of the ASEAN Region
03/24 – Alexander T Mohr & Jonas F Puck
Exploring the Determinants of the Trust-Control-Relationship in
International Joint Ventures
03/23 – Scott R Colwell & Sandra Hogarth-Scott
The Effect of Consumer Perception of Service Provider Opportunism 
on Relationship Continuance Behaviour: An Empirical Study in 
Financial Services
03/22 – Kathryn Watson & Sandra Hogarth-Scott
Understanding the Influence of Constraints to International
Entrepreneurship in Small and Medium-Sized Export Companie
03/21 – Dr A M Ahmed & Professor M Zairi 
The AEQL Framework Implementation: American Express Case Study
03/20 – Dr K J Bomtaia, Professor M Zairi & Dr A M Ahmed
Pennsylvania State University Case Study: 
A Benchmarking Exercise in Higher Education
03/19 – Alexander T Mohr & Jonas F Puck
Inter-Sender Role Conflicts, General Manager Satisfaction and Joint
Venture Performance in Indian-German Joint Ventures
03/18 – Mike Tayles & Colin Drury 
Profiting from Profitability Analysis in UK Companies?
03/17 – Dr Naser Al-Omaim, Professor Mohamed Zairi & Dr Abdel
Moneim Ahmed
Generic Framework for TQM Implementation with Saudi Context: 
An Empirical Study 
03/16 – AM Al-Saud, Dr AM Ahmed & Professor KE Woodward
Global Benchmarking of the Thrid Generation Telecommunication
System: Lessons Learned from Sweden Case Study
03/15 – Shelley L MacDougall & Richard Pike
Consider Your Options:  Changes to Stratetic Value During
Implementation of Advanced Manufacturing Technology
03/14 – Myfanwy Trueman & Richard Pike
Building Product Value by Design.  How Strong Accountants/Design
Relationships Can Provide a Long-Term Competitive
03/13 – Jiang Liu, Ke Peng & Shiyan Wang
Time Varying Prediction of UK Asset Returns
03/12 – A M Ahmed, Professor M Zairi & S A Alwabel
Global Benchmarking for Internet & E-Commerce Applications
03/11 – A M Ahmed, Professor M Zairi & Yong Hou
Swot Analysis for Air China Performance and Its Experience with Quality
03/10 – Kyoko Fukukawa & Jeremy Moon
A Japanese Model of Corporate Social Responsibility?: 
A study of online reporting
03/09 – Waleed Al-Shaqha and Mohamed Zairi
The Critical Factors Requested to Implement Pharmaceutical Care in
Saudit Arabian Hospitals: A Qualitative Study
03/08 – Shelly MacDougall & Richard Pike
The Elusive Return on Small Business Investment in AMT: Economic
Evaluation During Implementation
03/07 – Alexander T Mohr
The Relationship between Inter-firm Adjustment and Performance in
IJVs – the Case of German-Chinese Joint Ventures
03/06 – Belinda Dewsnap & David Jobber
Re-thinking Marketing Structures in the Fast Moving Consumer Goods
Sector: An Exploratory Study of UK Firms
03/05 – Mohamed Zairi & Samir Baidoun
Understanding the Essentials of Total Quality Management: 
A Best Practice Approach – Part 2
03/04 – Deli Yang & Derek Bosworth
Manchester United Versus China: The “Red Devils” Trademark Problems
in China
03/03 – Mohamed Zairi & Samir Baidoun
Understanding the Essentials of Total Quality Management: 
A Best Practice Approach – Part 1
03/02 – Alexander T Mohr
The Relationship Between Trust and Control in International Joint Ventures
(IJVs) – An Emprical Analysis of Sino-German Equity Joint Ventures
03/01 – Mike Tayles & Colin Drury
Explicating the Design of Cost Systems
2002
02/34 – Alexander T Mohr
Exploring the Performance of IJVs – A Qualitative and Quantitative
Analysis of the Performance of German-Chinese Joint Ventures in the
People’s Republic of China
02/33 – John M T Balmer & Edmund Gray
Comprehending Corporate Brands
02/32 – John M T Balmer
Mixed Up Over Identities
02/31 – Zoë J Douglas & Zoe J Radnor
Internal Regulatory Practices: Understanding the Cyclical Effects within
the Organisation
02/30 – Barbara Myloni, Dr Anne-Wil Harzing & Professor Hafiz Mirza
A Comparative Analysis of HRM Practices in Subsidiaries of MNCs and
Local Companies in Greece
02/29 – Igor Filatotchev
”Going Public with Good Governance’’: Board Selection and Share
Ownership in UK IPO Firms
02/28 – Axele Giroud
MNEs in Emerging Economies: What Explains Knowledge Transfer to
Local Suppliers
02/27 – Niron Hashai
Industry Competitiveness – The Role of Regional Sharing of Distance-
Sensitive Inputs (The Israeli – Arab Case)
02/26 – Niron Hashai
Towards a Theory of MNEs from Small Open Economics – Static and
Dynamic Perspectives
02/25 – Christopher Pass
Corporate Governance and The Role of Non-Executive Directors in Large
UK Companies: An Empirical Study
02/24 – Deli Yang
The Development of the Intellectual Property in China
02/23 – Roger Beach
Operational Factors that Influence the Successful Adoption of Internet
Technology in Manufacturing
02/22 – Niron Hashai & Tamar Almor
Small and Medium Sized Multinationals: The Internationalization
Process of Born Global Companies
02/21 – M Webster & D M Sugden
A Proposal for a Measurement Scale for Manufacturing Virtuality
02/20 – Mary S Klemm & Sarah J Kelsey
Catering for a Minority? Ethnic Groups and the British Travel Industry
02/19 – Craig Johnson & David Philip Spicer
The Action Learning MBA: A New Approach Management Education
02/18 – Lynda M Stansfield
An Innovative Stakeholder Approach to Management Education: 
A Case Study
02/17 – Igor Filatotchev, Mike Wright, Klaus Uhlenbruck, 
Laszlo Tihanyi & Robert Hoskisson
Privatization and Firm Restructuring in Transition Economies:
The Effects of Governance and Organizational Capabilities
02/16 – Mike Tayles, Andrew Bramley, Neil Adshead & Janet Farr
Dealing with the Management of Intellectual Capital: The Potential Role
of Strategic Management Accounting
02/15 – Christopher Pass
Long-Term Incentive Schemes, Executive Remuneration and Corporate
Perfomance
02/14 – Nicholas J Ashill & David Jobber
An Empirical Investigation of the Factors Affecting the Scope of
Information Needed in a MkIS
02/13 – Bill Lovell, Dr Zoe Radnor & Dr Janet Henderson
A Pragmatic Assessment of the Balanced Scorecard: An Evaluation use in
a NHS Multi-Agency Setting in the UK
02/12 – Zahid Hussain & Donal Flynn
Validating the Four-Paradigm Theory of Information Systems Development
02/11 – Alexander T Mohr & Simone Klein
The Adjustment of American Expatriate Spouses in Germany – 
A Qualitative and Quantative Analysis
02/10 – Riyad Eid & Myfanwy Trueman
The Adoption of The Internet for B-to-B International Marketing
02/09 – Richard Pike & Nam Cheng
Trade Credit, Late Payment and Asymmetric Information
02/08 – Alison J Killingbeck & Myfanwy M Trueman
Redrawing the Perceptual Map of a City
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02/07 – John M T Balmer
Corporate Brands: Ten Years On – What’s New?
02/06 – Dr Abdel Moniem Ahmed & Professor Mohamed Zairi
Customer Satisfaction: The Driving Force for Winning Business
Excellence Award
02/05 – John M T Balmer & Stephen A Greyser
Managing the Multiple Identities of the Corporation
02/04 – David Philip Spicer
Organizational Learning & The Development of Shared Understanding:
Evidence in Two Public Sector Organizations
02/03 – Tamar Almor & Niron Hashai
Configurations of International Knowledge-Intensive SMEs:
Can the Eclectic Paradigm Provide a Sufficient Theoretical Framework?
02/02 – Riyad Eid, Myfanwy Trueman & Abdel Moniem Ahmed
The Influence of Critical Success Factors on International Internet
Marketing
02/01 – Niron Hashai
The Impact of Distance Sensitivity and Economics of Scale on the
Output and Exports of Israel and its Arab Neighbours
2001
01/18 – Christopher M Dent
Transnational Capital, the State and Foreign Economic Policy:
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan
01/17 – David P Spicer & Eugene Sadler-Smith
The General Decision Making Style Questionnaire:
A Comfirmatory Analysis
01/16 – David P Spicer
Expanding Experimental Learning: Linking Individual and
Organisational learning, Mental Models and Cognitive Style
01/15 – E Grey & J Balmer
Ethical Identity; What is it? What of it?
01/14 – Mike Talyes & Colin Drury
Autopsy of a Stalling ABC System: A Case Study of Activity Based Cost
Management and Performance Improvement
01/13 – N Esho, R Zurbruegg, A Kirievsky & D Ward
Law and the Deminants of International Insurance Consumption
01/12 – J Andrews Coutts & Kwong C Cheug
Trading Rules and Stock Returns: Some Preliminary Short Run Evidence
from the Hang Seng 1985-1997
01/11 – D McKechnie & S Hogarth-Scott
Linking Internal Service Encounters and Internal Transactions: Unravelling
Internal Marketing Contract Workers
01/10 – M Webster & D M Sugden
Operations Strategies for the Exploitation of Protected Technology: Virtual
Manufacture as an Alternative to Outward licensing
01/09 – Axèle Giroud
Buyer-Supplier Transfer and Country of Origin: An Empirical Analysis of
FDI in Malaysia
01/08 – Damian Ward
Do Independent Agents Reduce Life Insurance Companies’ Free Cash Flow?
01/07 – Daragh O’Reilly
Corporate Images in ‘Jerry Maguire’: A Semiotic Analysis
01/06 – Tony Lindley & Daragh O’Reilly
Brand Identity on the Arts Sector
01/05 – M Trueman, J Balmer & D O’Reilly
Desperate Dome, Desperate Measures! Managing Innovation at London’s
Millennium Dome
01/04 – M Trueman, M Klemm, A Giroud & T Lindley
Bradford in the Premier League? A Multidisciplinary Approach to
Branding and Re-positioning a City 
01/03 – A Harzing
Self Perpetuating Myths and Chinese Whispers
01/02 – M Webster
Supply Systems Structure, Management and Performance:
A Research Agenda
01/01 – A Harzing
Acquisitions Versus Greenfield Investments: Exploring the Impact of the
MNC’s International Strategy
2000
0031 – John Ritchie & Sue Richardson
Leadership and Misleadership in Smaller Business Governance
0030 – Mary Klemm
Tourism and Ethnic Minorities in Bradford: Concepts and Evidence
0029 – (not available)
0028 – (not available)
0027 – Axèle Giroud
Determinant Factors of the Degree of Supply-Related Technology Transfer:
A Comparative Analysis Between Asian Affiliates
0026 – A Cullen, M Webster & A Muhlemann
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Systems: Definitions, Functionality and
the Contribution to Global Operations
0025 – B Chennoufi & M Klemm
Managing Cultural Differences in a Global Environment
0024 – (not available)
0023 – Simon Best & Devashish Pujari
Internet Marketing Effectiveness:
An Exploratory Examination in Tourism Industry
0022 – Dr Myfanwy Tureman
Divided Views, Divided Loyalties: Changing Customer Perceptions by Design
0021 – Yasar Jarrar
Becoming World Class Through a Culture of Measurement
0020 – David Spicer & Eugene Sadler-Smith
Cognitive Style & Decision Making
0019 – Z J Radnor & R Boaden
A Test for Corporate Anorexia
0018 – (not available)
0017 – Peter Prowse
Public Service Union Recruitment Workplace Recovery or Stagnation in
a Public Services Union? Evidence From a Regional Perspective
0016 – Yasar F Jarrar & Mohamed Zairi
Best Practice Transfer for Future Competitiveness:
A Study of Best Practices
0015 – Mike Tayles & Colin Drury
Cost Systems and Profitability Analysis in UK Companies: Selected
Survey Findings
0014 – B Myloni & A Harzing
Transferability of Human Resource Management Practices Across
Borders: A European Reflection on Greece 
0013 – (not available)
0012 – Nick J Freeman
Asean Investment Area: Progress and Challenges
0011 – Arvid Flagestad & Christine A Hope
A Model of Strategic Success in Winter Sports Destinations:
the Strategic Performance Pyramid
0010 – M Poon, R Pike & D Tjosvold
Budget Participation, Goal Interdependence and Controversy:
A Study of a Chinese Public Utility
0009 – Patricia C Fox, John M T Balmer & Alan Wilson
Applying the Acid Test of Corporate Identity Management
0008 – N Y Ashry & W A Taylor
Information Systems Requirements Analysis in Healthcare:
Diffusion or Translation?
0007 – T Lindley, D O’Reilly & T Casey
An Analysis of UK Television Advertisements for Alcohol
0006 – Eric Lindley & Frederick Wheeler
The Learning Square: Four Domains that Impact on Strategy
0005 – K K Lim, P K Ahmed & M Zairi
The Role of Sharing Knowledge in Management Initiatives
0004 – C De Mattos & S Sanderson
Expected Importance of Partners’ Contributions to Alliances in 
Emerging Economies: A Review
0003 – A Harzing
Acquisitions Versus Greenfield Investments: Both Sides of the Picture
0002 – Stuart Sanderson & Claudio De Mattos
Alliance Partners’ Expectations Concerning Potential Conflicts and
Implications Relative to Trust Building
0001 – A Harzing
An Empirical Test and Extension of the Bartlett & Ghoshal Typology of
Multinational Companies
1999
9922 – Gerry Randell & Maria del Pilar Rodriguez
Managerial Ethical Behaviour
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9921 – N Y Ashry & W A Taylor
Requirements Analysis as Innovation Diffusion: A Proposed
Requirements Analysis Strategy for the Development of an Integrated
Hospital Information Support System
9920 – C Hope
My Way’s The Right Way! Or, With Particular Reference to Teaching on
Tourism Courses, is ‘Best Practice’ in Operations Management
Dependent Upon National Culture?
9919 – A Harzing
Of Bumble-Bees and Spiders: The Role of Expatriates in Controlling
Foreign Subsidiaries
9918 – N Y Ashry & W A Taylor
Who will take the Garbage Out? The Potential of Information
Technology for Clinical Waste Management in the NHS
9917 – D O’Reilly
Nice Video(?), Shame about the Scam… Paedagogical Rhetoric Meets
Commercial Reality at Stew Leonard’s
9916 – A Harzing
The European Monolith: Another Myth in International Management?
9915 – S MacDougall & R Pike
The Influence of Capital Budgeting Implementation on Real Options: 
A Multiple-Case Study of New Technology Investments
9914 – C Pass, A Robinson & D Ward
Performance Criteria of Corporate Option and Long-Term Incentive
Plans: A Survey of 150 UK Companies 1994-1998
9913 – R Beach, A P Muhlemann, D H R Price, J A Sharp & A Paterson
Strategic Flexibility and Outsourcing in Global networks
9912 – H M stewart, C A Hope & A P Muhlemann
The Legal Profession, Networks and Service Quality
9911 – J F Keane
Design and the Management Paradigms of Self-Organisation
9910 – D O’Reilly
On the Precipice of a Revolution with Hamel and Prahalad
9909 – S Cameron & D Ward
Abstinence, Excess, Success?: Alcohol, Cigarettes, Wedlock & Earnings
9908 – M Klemm & J Rawel
Eurocamp – Strategic Development and Internationalisation in a
European Context
9907 – M Webster & R Beach
Operations Network Design, Manufacturing Paradigms
and the Subcontractor
9906 – D Ward
Firm Behaviour and Investor Choice: A Stochastic Frontier Analysis of
UK Insuramce
9905 – D Ward, C Pass & A Robinson
LTIPS and the Need to Examine the Diversity of CEO Remuneration
9904 – C Smallman
Knowledge Management as Risk Management: The Need for Open
Corporate Governance
9903 – R Beach, D Price, A Muhlemann & J Sharp
The Role of Qualitative Research in the Quest for Strategic Flexibility
9902 – N Hiley & C Smallman
Predicting Corporate Failure: A Literature Review
9901 – M Trueman
Designing Capital: Using Design to Enhance 
and Control Technological Innovation
1998
9826 – A Harzing
Cross-National Industrial Mail Surveys: Why do Response Rates Differ
Between Countries?
9825 – B Dewsnap and D Jobber
The Sales-Marketing Interface: A Synthesis of Theoretical Perspectives
and Conceptual Framework
9824 – C De Mattos
Advantageous Exectutives’ Characteristics in Establishing Biotechnology
Alliances in an Emerging Economy: The Case of Brazil
9823 – C A Howorth
An Empirical Examination of the Usefulness of the Cash Conversion Cycle
9822 – A Harzing
Who’s in Charge? An Empirical Study of Executive Staffiing Practices in
Foreign Subsidiaries
9821 – N Wakabayashi & J Gill
Perceptive Differences in Interorganizational Collaboration and
Dynamics of Trust
9820 – C Smallman
Risk Perception: State of the Art
9819 – C Smallman
The Breadth of Perceived Risk: Why Integrated Risk Management of
Health, Safety & Environmental Risks is only the End of the Beginning
9818 – P S Budhwar, A Popof & D Pujari
Evaluating Sales Management Training at Xerox in Greece: 
An Exploratory Study
9817 – W A Taylor
An Information-Based Perspective on 
Knowledge Capture in Business Processes
9816 – S Hogarth-Scott
Category Management Relationships: 
Is it Really Trust Where Choice is Limited?
9815 – W A Taylor
Sustaining Innovation in Organisations: Managing the Intangibles 
A Study of TQM Implementation in Northern Ireland Organisations
1991-1996
9814 – M Webster, A Muhlemann and C Alder
Subcontract Manufacture in Electronics Assembly: 
A Survey of Industry Practice
9813 – M J S Harry
Is Object-Orientation Subject-Oriented?: Conflicting and 
Unresolved Philosophies in Object-Oriented Information 
Systems Development Methodology
9812 – J Jackson
The Introduction of Japanese Continuous Improvement Practices to a
Traditional British Manufacturing Site: The Case of RHP Bearings
(Ferrybridge)
9811 – C De Mattos
A Comparative Study Between Perceptions of British and German
Executives, in the Biotechnology Sector, Relative to Potential Future
Contributions of Greatest Importance to and from Transnational
Alliance Partners in Emerging Economies
9810 – J Martin-Hirsch & G Wright
The Cost of Customer Care – A Value Analysis of Service Delivery
Approaches
9809 – J Martin-Hirsch & G Wright
A Service Provider’s View of Success Factors in Alternative Service
Stategies
9808 – J Martin-Hirsch & G Wright
A Professional’s Evaluation of Alternative Service Delivery Regimes for
Customer Care and Satisfaction
9807 – J Martin-Hirsch & G Wright
A User’s Perspective of Alternative Service Delivery: A Comparative
Study of the Evaluation of Service Strategies
9806 – J Martin-Hirsch & G Wright
The Case for Choice in Health Care: A Comparison of Traditional and
Team Midwifery in Effective Service Provision
9805 – M Woods, M Fedorkow amd M Smith
Modelling the Learning Organisation
9804 – W A Taylor
An Action Research Study of Knowledge Management in Process Industries
9803 – C Singleton
Quantitative and Qualitative – Bridging the Gap Between Two
Opposing Paradigms
9802 – R McClements & C Smallman
Managing in the New Millennium: Reflections on Change, Management and
the Need for Learning
9801 – P Eyre & C Smallman
Euromanagement Competencies in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises:
A Development Path for the New Millenium
1997
9729 – C Smallman
Managerial Perceptions of Organisational 
Hazards and their Associated Risks
9728 – C Smallman & D Weir
Managers in the Year 2000 and After: A Strategy for Development
9727 – R Platt
Ensuring Effective Provision of Low Cost Housing Finance in India: 
An In-Depth case Analysis
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9726 – (not available)
9725 – (not available)
9724 – S Estrin, V Perotin, A Robinson & N Wilson
Profit-Sharing Revisited: British and French Experience Compared
9723 – (not available)
9722 – R Beach, A P Muhlemann, A Paterson, D H R Price and J A Sharp 
Facilitating Strategic Change in Manufacturing Industry
9721 – R Beach, A P Muhlemann, A Paterson, D H R Price and J A Sharp
The Strategy Options in Manufacturing Industry: Propositions Based on
Case Histories
9720 – A Giroud
Multinational Firms Backward Linkages in Malaysia: A Comparison
between European and Asian Firms in the Electrical and Electronics Sector
9719 – L Kening
Foreign Direct Investment in China: Performance, Climate and Impact
9718 – H Mirza
Towards a Strategy for Enhancing ASEAN’s Locational Advantages for
Attracting Greater Foreign Direct Investment
9717 – B Summers & N Wilson
An Empirical Study of the Demand for Trade Credit in UK
Manufacturing Firms
9716 – R Butler & J Gill
Reliable Knowledge and Trust in Partnership Formation
9715 – R Butler 
Stories and Experiments in Organisational Research
9714 – M Klemm & L Parkinson
British Tour Operators: Blessing or Blight
9713 – C A Hope
What Does Quality Management Mean for 
Tourism Companies and Organisations?
9712 – S Hogarth-Scott & P Dapiran
Do Retailers and Suppliers Really have Collaborative Category
Management Relationships?: Category Management Relationships in
the UK and Australia
9711 – C De Mattos
The Importance of Potential Future Contributions from/to Transnational
Joint Venture Partners: Perception of Brazilian Managing Directors and
Specialists Linked to Biotechnology
9710 – N T Ibrahim & F P Wheeler
Are Malaysian Corporations Ready for Executive Information Systems?
9709 – F P Wheeler & A W Nixon
Monitoring Organisational Knowledge in Use
9708 – M Tayles & C Drury
Scoping Product Costing Research: A Strategy for Managing the Product
Portfolio – Cost System Design
9707 – N Wilson, B Summers & C Singleton
Small Business Demand for Trade Credit, Credit Rationing and the Late
Payment of Commercial Debt: An Empirical Study
9706 – R Beach, A P Muhlemann, A Paterson, D H R Price & J A Sharp
The Management Information Systems as a Source of Flexibility: 
A Case Study
9705 – E Marshall
Business Ethics: The Religious Dimension
9704 – M Wright, N Wilson & K Robbie
The Longer Term Effects of Management-Led Buy-Outs
9703 – G Hopkinson & S Hogarth Scott
Quality of Franchise Relationships: The Implications of Micro Economic
Theories of Franchising
9702 – G C Hopkinson & S Hogarth-Scott
Channel Conflict: Critical Incidents or Telling Tales. 
Methodologies Compared
9701 – K Watson, S. Hogarth-Scott & N Wilson
Marketing Success Factors and Key Tasks in Small Business Development
1996
9619 – B Summers & N Wilson
Trade Credit Management and the Decision to use Factoring: 
An Empirical Study
9618 – M Hiley & H Mirza
The Economic Prospects of ASEAN : The Role of AFTA in the Future
Development of the Region
9617 – A Brown
Prospects for Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in Thailand
9616 – H Mirza, K H Wee & F Bartels
The Expansion Strategies of Triad Corporations in East Asia
9615 – M Demirbag & H Mirza
Inter-Partner Reliance, Exchange of Resources & Partners’ Influence on
J’V’s Strategy
9614 – R H Pike & N S Cheng
Motives for Investing in Accounts Receivable: Theory and Evidence
9613 - R H Pike & N S Cheng
Business Trade Credit Management: Experience of Large UK Firms
9612 – R Elliott, S Eccles & K Gournay
Man Management? Women and the Use of Debt to Control 
Personal Relationships
9611 – R Elliott, S Eccles & K Gournay
Social Support, Personal Relationships & Addictive Consumption
9610 – M Uncles & A Manaresi
Relationships Among Retail Franchisees and Frachisors: 
A Two-Country Study
9609 – S Procter
Quality in Maternity Services: 
Perceptions of Managers, Clinicians and Consumers’
9608 – S Hogarth-Scott & G P Dapiran
Retailer-Supplier Relationships: An Integrative Framework Based on
Category Management Relationships
9607 – N Wilson, S Hogarth-Scott & K Watson
Factors Contributing to Entrepreneurial 
Success in New Start Small Businesses
9606 – R Beach, A P Muhlemann, A Paterson, D H R Price & J A Sharp
The Evolutionary Development of the Concept Manufacturing Flexibility
9605 – B Summers
Using Neural Networks for Credit Risk Management: 
The Nature of the Models Produced
9604 – P J Buckley & M Carter
The Economics of Business Process Design: Motivation, Information &
Coordination Within the Firm
9603 – M Carter
Is the Customer Always Right? 
Information, Quality and Organisational Architecture
9602 – D T H Weir
Why Does the Pilot Sit at the Front? And Does it Matter?
9601 – R A Rayman
A Proposal for Reforming the Tax System
1995
9506 – A L Riding & B Summers
Networks that Learn and Credit Evaluation
9505 – R A Rayman
The Income Concept: A Flawed Ideal?
9504 – S Ali & H Mirza
Market Entry Strategies in Poland: A Preliminary Report
9503 – R Beach, A P Muhlemann, A Paterson, D H.R Price & J A Sharp
An Adaptive Literature Search Paradigm
9502 – A S C Ehrenberg & M Uncles 
Direchlet-Type Markets: a Review, Part 2: Applications & Implications
9501 – M Uncles & A S C Ehrenberg
Direchlet-Type Markets: A Review, Part 1: Patterns and Theory
1994
9411 – R A Rayman
The Real-Balance Effect Fallacy and The Failure of Unemployment Policy
9410 – R A Rayman
The Myth of ‘Says’ Law
9409 not issued
9408 not issued
9407 not issued
9406 not issued
9405 – F Bartels & N Freeman
Multinational Enterprise in Emerging Markets: International Joint
Ventures in Côte D’Ivoire Vietnam
9404 – E Marshall
The Single Transferable Vote – A Necessary Refinement Abstract
9403 – G R Dowling & M Uncles
Customer Loyalty programs: Should Every Firm Have One?
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9402 – N Wilson, A Pendleton & M Wright
The impact of Employee Ownership on Employee Attitudes: 
Evidence from UK ESOPS
9401 – N Wilson & M J Peel
Working Capital & Financial Management 
Practices in the Small Firm Sector
1993
9310 – R Butler, L Davies, R Pike & J Sharp
Effective Investment Decision-Making: The Concept and its
Determinants no longer available
9309 – A Muhlemann, D Price, M Afferson & J Sharp
Manufacturing Information Systems as a Means for Improving 
the Quality of Production Management Decisions in Smaller
Manufacturing Enterprises
9308 – F P Wheeler, R J Thomas & S H Chang
Towards Effective Executive Information Systems
9307 – F P Wheeler, S H Chang & R J Thomas
The Transition from an Executive Information System to Everyone’s
Information System: Lessons from a Case Study
9306 – S H Chang, F P Wheeler & R J Thomas
Modelling Executive Information Needs
9305 – S. Braga Rodrigues & D Hickson
Success in Decision Making: Different Organisations, 
Differing Reasons for Success.
9304 – R J Butler, R S Turner, P D Coates, R H Pike & D H R Price
Ideology, Technology and Effectiveness
9303 – R J Butler, R S Turner, P D Coates, R H Pike & D H R Price
Strategy, Structure and Technology
9302 – R J Butler, R S Turner, P D Coates, R H Pike & D H R Price
Competitive Strategies and New Technology 
9301 – R J Butler, R S Turner, P D Coates, R H Pike & D H R Price
Investing in New Technology for Competitive Advantage
Copies of the above papers can be obtained by contacting the Research
Programme Administrative Secretary at the address below:
Bradford University School of Management
Emm Lane
Bradford
West Yorkshire
BD9 4JL
Tel: ++44 (01)1274 234323 (mornings only)
Fax: ++44 (01)1274 546866
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